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Racial Discrimination and Racial Preference
in Justice O'Connor's "Newest" Equal
Protection Jurisprudence
JUSTIN SCHWARTZ*
Under the Leadership of Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court has
fashioned a uniform standard for examining the constitutionality of racial
classifications under the Equal Protection Clause. Though her standard is
appropriately labeled as strict scrutiny for both invidious and benevolent
classifications, it should not be understood as "strict in theory, fatal in fact"
and it is not color-blind. Instead, Justice O'Connor's newest equal protection
jurisprudence is "not quite color-blind." The standard is consistently high and
it demands that for a classification to be acceptable it must normally be
confined to remedial aims and that the claims to a benevolent purpose must be
genuine and justified.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a series of recent cases concerning racial preferences, the Supreme
Court, largely under the leadership of Justice O'Connor, has articulated a new
doctrine concerning the constitutionality of governmental racial classifications
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment., The Court
has determined, after twenty five years of debate, that the most stringent
standard of review ("strict scrutiny") applies to all such classifications, even
those intended to benefit rather than to burden historically disadvantaged
minorities.2 This standard has been applied to racial preference programs in
* J.D. (expected), The Ohio State University College of Law, 1998; Ph.D., University
of Michigan, 1989; M.A., University of Michigan, 1984; M.Phil., Cambridge University,
1982; A.B., Princeton University, 1979. Thanks for helpful comments on early drafts are due
to Professors Elizabeth Anderson, N. Scott Arnold, Francis X. Beytagh, Edward P. Foley,
Stanley Laughlin, to Kary Moss, Esq., and to Margaret Nero, Angelique Paul, Rebecca
Woods, Jeff Yeager, Elizabeth Ziewacz, and other members of the managing boards of the
Ohio State Law Journal.
I U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall... deny to any person... the equal
protection of the laws.").
2 My discussion focuses mainly on racial preferences for Blacks, who have been in a
uniquely disadvantaged social, economic, and political position, and who remain so despite
significant improvements. I do not slight the problems faced by other minority groups, but
space prevents treating of these more than incidentally. In any event, the Court's doctrine
regarding race does not distinguish between different minority groups, nor indeed, today, in
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employment, state and federal government contracting, and voter districting.3
The Court has yet to revisit affirmative action programs in higher education. 4
Does the new standard mean that the Court has adopted a color-blind theory of
equal protection, holding in effect that any racial classification by the
government is unconstitutional, that no governmental unit may take race into
account except to cure a plain constitutional violation of equal protection?5 Has
the Court sub silentio overruled Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, the charter for affirmative action in higher education?
While several Justices now adhere to a color-blind view, I argue in Part II
that the Court's new doctrine should not be so understood. Rather, its approach
is "not quite color-blind." This is roughly in accord with the modem tradition
in equal protection jurisprudence. After explaining the policy interests behind
the racial preference programs developed since the late 1960s, I then show that
these programs are consistent with the original intentions of the framers and
with the modem tradition of Supreme Court equal protection jurisprudence of
race. In current debates around the constitutionality of racial preference itself,
the Court is closely divided.
I then consider in Part III whether the adoption of a uniform standard of
review for all governmental racial classifications means that the Court has
departed from tradition and precedent. This depends on the intent of Justice
O'Connor, the pivotal vote on these issues in the last decade and author of the
crucial opinions in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, and Shaw v. Reno (Shaw 1). Given the current alignment of the Court,
Justice O'Connor's views are dispositive in this area. 6 Her views do not support
an important sense, between different races at all.
3 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (opinion of O'Connor,
J.) (holding federal minority set-aside subject to strict scrutiny); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
653 (1993) (Shawl) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (holding racially based voting reapportionment
plan subject to strict scrutiny); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (invalidating a municipal minority set-aside for
government contracting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986)
(plurality opinion of Powell, J.) (stating that a race-conscious layoff provision in education is
subject to strict scrutiny).
4 The Court declined to review Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
diversity-promoting affirmative action in higher education unconstitutional), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 2581 (1996), raising doubts about the continued viability of Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See infra Section III (C) for discussion.
5 This is the interpretation of current Supreme Court doctrine urged by the majority in
the Fifth Circuit panel in Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 939-40, 946.
6 Justice O'Connor is "the key voice on the Supreme Court in affirmative action cases."
David P. Stoelting, Case Note, Minority Business Set-Asides Must Be Supported by Specific
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a color-blind interpretation of current doctrine. Justice O'Connor's "newest"
equal protection jurisprudence means that the strict scrutiny applied in racial
preferences is not "strict in theory, fatal in fact,"'7 but rather lowers the
demands of strict scrutiny to allow some government flexibility in view of the
persistence of racial discrimination and its effects.
On one hand, Justice O'Connor would allow an as-yet undetermined scope
for some racial preference as a remedial measure even where a governmental
actor has not discriminated in the past and perhaps, at least in higher education,
as a forward-looking nonremedial measure to attain goals such as diversity,
vindicating Bakke. On the other hand, the application of even a lowered strict
scrutiny standard involves a departure from the Burger and early Rehnquist
Courts' fairly permissive approach towards remedial and other noninvidious
racial preferences, especially federal ones.8 Her new standard is especially
rigorous in the voting apportionment context, but even there it eschews color-
blindness.
II. RACIAL PREFERENCE AND THE HISTORY OF EQUAL PROTECTION
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Historical Interests Behind Racial Preference Programs
Looming over the public and judicial debate concerning racial preference is
the legacy of slavery and racism. Segregation, institutionalized in the Jim Crow
policies authorized under Plessy v. Ferguson,9 was overturned only in 1954 by
Brown v. Board of Education.10 From 1954 to 1969, when the Nixon
administration firmiy established affirmative action as national policy, 11 Blacks
were largely confined to the lowest rungs of the economic ladder and to a great
Evidence of Prior Discrimination: Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), 58
U. CIN. L. REV. 1097, 1118 (1990). With Justice O'Connor's subsequent opinions in Shaw I
and Adarand Constructors, Stoelting's judgment has been vindicated and extended from
affirmative action to broader issues of racial preference. Justice O'Connor is now not merely
a swing vote, but a leader of the Court on this issue, able to win not merely pluralities but
actual majorities for her views.
7 The expression is due to Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
8 See infra note 25.
9 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896) (upholding segregation in public transportation).
10 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954) (striking down "separate but equal" in public education).
11 See JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMAIVE ACTION 175-221 (1996),
for a history of the origins of the policy.
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though somewhat lesser extent they still are. 12 They remain severely
underrepresented in the professions.1 3 Comparatively few Blacks owned or
own businesses of any size.14 In higher education, Blacks do worse on the
measures used by universities to assess applicants15 and so, before affirmative
action, were largely excluded especially from the better programs in higher
education. 16 Color-blind admissions would mean, for example, that Black
enrollment at law schools would drop from between 60% to 80%.17 The most
12 Comparing 1960 to 1990, Blacks, then as now comprising about 10% of the
workforce, were 2.2% of electricians and are now 6.2%; 4.6% of aircraft mechanics, now
9.8%; 2.5% of firefighters, now 11.5%; 5.0% of structural metal workers, now 3.7%; but
they were 54.3% of domestic servants, now "only" 24.7%; and 24.9% of chefs and cooks,
now "only" 18.3%. See ANDREw HACKER, Two NATIONs: BLACK AND WHrTE, SEPARATE,
HOSTE, UNEQUAL 111-13 (1992). At the high end of the socioeconomic scale, the situation
is similar. In the 1980s, only three Blacks appeared among Forbes magazine's list of the 400
richest Americans. In 1991 only one Black headed one of America's top 1,000 corporations.
See id. at 108.
13 Still comparing 1960 to 1990, Blacks were 1.6% of accountants and auditors and are
now 7.4%; 4.4% of college teachers, now 4.5%; 1.3% of lawyers, now 3.2%; 4.4% of
physicians, now 3.0%. See id. at 113.
14 Based on 1990 Census figures, there are about 425,000 Black-owned businesses,
roughly 2.4% of the nation's enterprises. The average annual receipts are around $50,000 and
85% of these firms are one-person enterprises or family firms with no employees. See id. at
108.
15 In general, whites average more than 100 points higher than minorities on
examinations of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) sort than minorities. See ALAN P.
SINDLER, BAKKE, DEFuNis, AND MINoarry ADMISSONS 122 (1978). In the 1990 SATs,
Blacks averaged 737 out of 1600 compared to whites at 933. While scores improve with
income, even the average of the highest income Blacks (854) is lower than that of the lowest
income whites (879). See HACKER, supra note 12, at 142-43. Grades for Blacks are similarly
systematically lower. In the mid-1970s, 20% of white but only 1% of Black applicants had a
600+ (out of 800) LSAT and a higher than B+ GPA. See Amicus Brief for Association of
American Law Schools at 20, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(No. 76-811).
16 In 1965, fifteen years after the Supreme Court ordered the desegregation of
professional schools in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950), Blacks were 1.3% of all
law students; about half were at Black law schools. There were 434 Black students at all the
ABA-approved, mostly white law schools. By 1976, largely due to affirmative action,
minority enrollment at the ABA-approved law schools was 8.2%, of which Blacks comprised
58%. See SiNDLER, supra note 15, at 31-33.
17 See Franklin P. Adams, The Social Impact of Bakke, 4 LEARNiNG AND THE LAW 1,
51-52 (1977) (summarizing Applications and Admissions to ABA Accredited Law Schools: An
Analysis of the Data for the Class Entering in the Fall 1976 (1977)). These figures are borne
out by the 80% drop in minority admissions to the University of Texas Law School, after
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plausible explanation for these grim facts is historical and continuing racism, 18
much of it governmentally authorized or sanctioned at least through the end of
the 1960s. There is no reason to suppose that Blacks are innately less able than
whites to excel in employment, business, or education.19 Blacks have also been
disproportionately excluded from political representation. Before the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Blacks were, practically speaking, denied the right to vote
in many states. Voter districting, racial bloc voting, and winner-take all
elections ensure that Blacks are still less able than whites to gain public office. 20
Hopwood, for the class entering in 1998, and by a similar drop in the law schools at Berkeley
and UCLA after the California Civil Rights Amendment was enacted. See Anthony Lewis,
Whiter than White, N.Y. TMs, May 23, 1997, at A31; infra note 223.
18 "[S]ubstantial numbers of Americans are perfectly willing to express frankly negative
characterizations of blacks." PAUL M. SNmERmAN & THoMAs PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RAcE
64 (1993). Of whites surveyed in the 1991 National Race Survey 52% agree with
characterizing Blacks as "aggressive or violent"; 45% as "boastful"; 41% as "complaining";
34% as "lazy"; 21% as "irresponsible." Id. at 45. This translates into discrimination. The
Urban Institute found that Black testers in Chicago and Washington, D.C., were denied a job
offered to an equally qualified white counterpart 15% of the time; vice versa, only 5%.
Discrimination was markedly higher in Washington, D.C., despite the government's
dominant role as employer. MARGERY Ausm Tun E R Er AL., OPPORTUNrrIEs DENmD,
OPPORTuNrrmEs DmINIH : DISCRIMINAnON IN HIRING 1-2 (Urban Institute 1991).
19 Careful studies show that there are no inherent group-related differences among the
races. See generally STEP EN JAY GOULD, THE NMmAsuRE OF MAN 321-34 (1980); LEON
KAMiN, THE ScIENcE AND POLmcs OF IQ 15-30 (1974); Richard C. Lewontin, Race and
Intelligence, in TIE IQ CoNT'ovERsY78 (N.J. Block & Gerald Dworkin eds. 1976). Income
as well as racism makes a difference in explaining the racial differential in test scores. In 1972
to 1989, Black income was 68% of the national average while various white groups ranged
from 93 % to 155% of the national average. See CHlUsropmH JENcKs, Rm iNG SocIAL
PouCy: RACE, PovERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASs 28 (1992). But income cannot be the whole
story. Hispanics had lower test scores than whites and higher incomes than Blacks during this
period and the test scores of the best-off Blacks averaged lower than those of the worst-off
whites. See HACKER, supra note 12, at 142-43. It has been suggested that cultural differences
such as the relative importance placed on education are salient causes of differential
performance. See RICHARD J. HERRNSIBIN & CHARLs MuRRAY, THE BELL CURvE:
INTELuGENcE AND CLASS STRUcrURE IN AMERICAN IFE 286-88 (1994). These alleged
differences are disputable for discussion see various essays in THE BELL CURvE DEBATE:
HISTORY, DOCULms, OPINoNs (Russell Jacoby & Naomi Glauberman eds. 1995) but in
any case neither culture nor lower Black incomes are variables independent of the history of
racism.
20 From the end of Reconstruction to 1993 there were no Blacks in the United States
Senate. In this century no Black governor was elected until the 1980s, when Douglas Wilder
won the statehouse in Virginia. Only 1.5% of elected officials nationally are Black, mostly
mayors from majority-Black towns with populations under 1,000. See LAm GummR, THE
19971 1059
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Against this unhappy background, it was recognized early in the civil rights
revolution that strictly color-blind policies were inadequate to remedy the
effects of racial discrimination. In President Johnson's famous words, "[y]ou do
not take a person.., hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the
starting line of a race and then say, 'You are free to compete with all the
others,' and still justly believe that you have been completely fair." 21 Once
systematically disfavored in law and practice, minorities had to be
systematically favored to gain redress and attain the equality guaranteed by the
Constitution.
As race-conscious remedies like busing and minority districting were
developed in the late 1960S2 2 to enforce school desegregation and violations of
minority voting rights, businesses, universities, and government turned towards
racial preference programs. These have varied in form from minority quotas,
hiring targets and timetables, and set-asides to treating race as a "plus" factor
among others or designing voting districts so that minority votes had greater
weight. All were designed to redress past and ongoing inequities, to afford
minorities opportunities previously denied them and which would be generally
unavailable under color-blind policies and individualized enforcement of anti-
discrimination law, and in some cases, such as university admissions policies,
to foster nonremedial goals such as diversity.
From the perspective of minorities and government, the alternatives to
color-conscious policies were impracticable. Individual civil rights lawsuits are
expensive and involve long delays. Claims of discrimination are difficult to
prove even when justified. Federal enforcement in individual cases, given the
level of resources committed by Congress, has been extremely slow.2 3 From
the perspective of business, racial preferences have been a way to mollify
widespread minority discontent and avoid the threat of lawsuits.24 From the
TYRANNY OF THm MAJORrTY: FUNDAMENTAL FAmNESS IN REPRESENTATIV DEMOCRACY 38
(1994).
21 President Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, Commencement Speech at
Howard University (June 4, 1965) in THE AFFmMATIVE ACnoN DEBATE 16, 17 (George E.
Curry ed. 1996).
22 For a discussion of these policies, see SKRENTNY, supra note I 1 (affirmative action),
GUnER, supra note 20 (minority districting), and RICHARD KLUGER, SIaLE JUSTICE: THE
HIsTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (1976) (busing).
23 The EEOC backlog was over 125,000 cases by 1976. The law stated that complaints
would be processed in 60 days, but by 1968, the average case took from 16 months to two
years. See SKRENTNY, supra note 11, at 124.
24 See id. at 89-91; United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210-11
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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perspective of universities, affirmative action allowed the enhancement of racial
diversity. Color-consciousness thus combined economic efficiency, provident
use of government resources, and justice for minorities, as well as furthering
important nonremedial goals. Such programs won the imprimatur of the Burger
and early Rehnquist Courts in a series of important cases in the 1970s and
1980s.25
These policies and decisions were and remain quite controversial. 26 Many
people view such race-conscious policies as reverse discrimination, no better
than, or in their own way as harmful as, the racism they purport to combat.
Some legal scholars, accepting this characterization, have argued that racial
preference policies, whatever their purpose, are unconstitutional, violative of
the Equal Protection Clause, which, they say, requires a color-blind reading of
the Constitution. 27 This is not Justice O'Connor's view. Neither is it consistent
25 'Me key employment cases are Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (holding voluntary affirmative
action in private employment consistent with Title VII); Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 641-42 (1987) (holding same for public employers); Sheet Metal Workers
Local 28 v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 442 (1986) (upholding use of union funds to increase
minority membership); International Association of Firefighters, Local 93 v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515 (1986) (upholding consent decree requiring employer to
promote minority employees). Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), is the key case in university admissions. In school desegregation, the leading case is
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 3 (1971) (approving
involuntary busing). In government contracting, the high-water mark of the Court's tolerance
for racial preference was Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (approving a
federal minority set-aside). Finally, in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,
155 (1977), the Court upheld apportionment of voting districts to ensure that minority voters
are represented.
26 It is hard to assess public attitudes towards affirmative action because the figures are
so variable depending on how the survey questions are framed. The 1988 National Election
Study found that 90% of whites opposed "[p]reference in hiring and promotion for jobs" and
76% opposed "[r]acial quotas for college admissions" (illegal under Bakke), but a 1988
Harris poll found that 55% of whites favored "affirmative action programs for blacks and
other minorities, which do not have rigid quotas." SNIDERmAN & PtAZZA, supra note 18, at
130. Minority support for race-conscious policies is very high. In 1996, the referendum on
California Proposition 209, requiring that the state follow entirely color-blind policies, see
infra note 223, passed 54%-46%, with white voters (63% 37%) favoring it; and Blacks
(26%-74%), Latinos (24%-76%), and Asians (39% 61%) opposing it. See State
Propositions: A Snapshot of Voters, L.A. ThIms, Nov. 7, 1996, at A29.
27 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of
Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Or. REv. 22, reprinted in RICHAR
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JusncE 364 (1983); William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:
Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 775, 809-10 (1979).
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with the history of Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, as is argued in the
following section. Her position, which would allow racial preferences that pass
the strict scrutiny test, is more consonant with traditional doctrine, although not
fully so. After a brief survey of that history, the rest of this Comment is
devoted to an explication of her treatment of racial preference in the opinions
that define current equal protection doctrine about race.
B. The Equal Protection Clause Is Not Color-Blind: Background
1. Original Intent and Early History
The original intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was not to
bar governmental use of racial classifications.28 They saw equal protection as a
matter of guaranteeing the "civil rights" of Blacks as citizens of the United
States to free movement, access to the courts, and property ownership, but not
political rights to vote or serve on juries, much less the promotion of social
equality reflected in a right to intermarry, attend integrated schools, and the
like.29 Their specific concern was to protect newly freed slaves from certain
extreme and specific abuses embodied in the Southern "Black Codes." This
conception allowed for race-conscious legislation that designedly favored
Blacks, such as the Freedman's Bureau Act.30 It also allowed much that
28 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARv. L. REV. 1 passim (1955); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 201-33 (rev.
ed. 1965).
29 It is clear from the legislative history that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended,
minimally, as a constitutional embodiment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Bickel, supra
note 28, at 61. But the "civil rights" it was meant to protect were narrowly conceived. See id.
at 16. Rep. Wilson explained, "'Do [civil rights] mean that in all things civil, social, and
political, all citizens without distinction of race or color, shall be equal? By no means ....
[C]ivil rights [include] the right of personal security, [the right of personal liberty, and the
right to acquire and enjoy property.'" Id. at 16-17 (citations omitted). Congress repeatedly
rejected proposals to bar discrimination on account of race or color. See TENBRoEK, supra
note 28, at 205-06. Bickel says, "[I]t is difficult to interpret the deliberate choice against
using the term 'civil rights' [rather than 'equal protection'] as anything but a rejection of what
were deemed its wider implications." Bickel, supra note 28, at 57.
30 See Bickel, supra note 28, at 8. As Justice Marshall observed, the Freedman's Bureau
Act "provided many of its benefits only to Negroes" and "since [the] Congress [that]
considered and rejected the objections to [that Act] concerning special relief to Negroes also
proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, it is inconceivable that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to prohibit all race-conscious relief measures." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 397-98 (1978).
1062 [Vol. 58:1055
A NOT QUITE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTON
disfavored Blacks. Notoriously, the Reconstruction Congress did nothing about
segregated schools in the District of Columbia or about many other racially
discriminatory federal and state policies.
The late nineteenth century Court followed the outlines of this approach in
its main equal protection decisions. The first strand of the original
understanding, as a charter for Black emancipation, was reflected in the
Slaughter House Cases,31 which stated the "Negro rights theory" of the
Fourteenth Amendment while effectively limiting its application by limiting the
authority of the federal government to enforce it. More true to the spirit of this
strand was Strauder v. West Virginia, striking down a state prohibition on
Blacks serving as jurors. 32 There the Court said that the Equal Protection
Clause is an "exemption from legal discriminations implying
inferiority... [and] which are steps towards reducing [Blacks] to the condition
of a subject race." 33 The second strand of the original understanding, as
allowing Blacks to be disfavored, was inscribed in the infamy of Plessy v.
Ferguson, which enshrined "separate but equal" in the Constitution for 58
years. The remark that the Constitution is "color-blind"34 was coined in Justice
Harlan's famous dissent. The second strand is, happily, dead. But equal
protection must be considered in light of modem conditions, as Chief Justice
Warren acknowledged in Brown, which sounded the death knell for
segregation.35
2. The Modem Tradition
The line of cases regarded as authoritative in the modem tradition departs
from the second strand of the original intent but not from the first. It prohibits
racial classifications that disfavor racial minorities but cannot be construed to
require a color-blind theory of equal protection. That explains why the
comparatively conservative Burger Court found it so natural to uphold the
racial preference programs developed to defeat the effects of discrimination.
31 83 U.S. 36 (1873). This case did not concern a racial classification. The Court
rejected the sort of substantive due process claim, advanced by white artisans, that it later
embraced inLochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), on the grounds that due process was
narrowly procedural and equal protection was solely about the protection of Blacks. See
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872).
32 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880).
33 Id. at 308.
34 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896), overrded by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
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Modem equal protection doctrine, up until recently, has been cast in the mode
of guarding against "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities." 36
Although racial preferences were not considered by the Court until the 1970s,
the rationale of the decisions invalidating invidious discrimination clearly admits
of noninvidious racial preferences that do not involve the evils of racism. As the
Court understands them, these evils seem to be tWO. 37 One is that invidious
discrimination stigmatizes its victims. The other is that it reflects animus on the
part of its majority perpetrators. Consider these in turn.
a. Stigmatization
Justice Harlan's great dissent in Plessy was based on the idea that
segregation "proceed[ed] on the ground that colored citizens are... inferior
and degraded" and so imposed on them "a badge of servitude" for the benefit
of a "dominant race."' 38 In Brown, the Court rejected segregation in public
education because it "generates a feeling of inferiority as to [the] status [of
Black children] in the community that.., affects their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone." 39 In Loving v. Virginia,40 the Court struck
down laws prohibiting racial intermarriage as "measures designed to maintain
White Supremacy." 41 Justice O'Connor is concerned that noninvidious racial
preferences may stigmatize their beneficiaries. 42 I argue below that this is an
improper consideration from a legal perspective. Whatever its factual merit,43
36 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis
added); see also JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISaUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REviEw 75-77, 82-88 (1980) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY] (providing more extensive
analysis); John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm.
L. Rav. 723, 741 (1974) [hereinafter Ely, Constitutionality] ("There is nothing suspicious
about a majority's [legislating] against itself.").
37 See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 6-9 (1976).
38 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560, 562.
39 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
40 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
4 1 Id. atll.
42 See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor,
J.) ("Classifications based on race carry [the] danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are
strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority....").
43 Certainly the concern is felt by some Blacks. Professor Carter reports feeling insulted
when he discovered that he was preferred for Harvard Law because he was Black-he went
to Yale, where his race also counted. See Stephen L. Carter, Racial Preferences?: So Wat?,
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remedial racial preferences, unlike invidious discrimination, are in no way
intended to mean that anyone is inferior or degraded because of race.
b. Prejudice
Racial classifications may be "expressions of hostility or antagonism
to[wards] certain groups of individuals." 44 This concern was stated as a basis
for heightened review in United States v. Carolene Products Co.45 In
Korematsu v. United States,46 the case that originated the notion of strict
scrutiny regarding racial classifications, Justice Black said, "Pressing public
necessity" might justify "curtail[ing] the civil rights of a single racial group,"
but "racial antagonism never can," and while "all [such] legal
restrictions... are immediately suspect," this was because they might embody
racial prejudice. 47 Justice Black felt that restrictions that did not, as he believed
the Japanese-American relocation policy would not, would survive strict
scrutiny.48 This emphasis on prejudice is reflected in the Court's subsequent
determination that a violation of equal protection requires discriminatory
purpose,49 or in the public education context, segregative purpose or intent,5 0
and not merely disparate impact. The only way to sensibly understand the
concern with discriminatory purpose or intent is as a concern with imposition of
racial classifications because of prejudice, not the mere intentional use of such
classifications for any purpose whatsoever.
c. Ethics
The ethical theory implicit in the modem tradition is that the intended
in DEBATING AFFIRMATIvE ACTON: RACE, GENDER, E=NIcrrY, AND TE PoLmcs OF
INCLUSION 151, 155 (Nicolaus Mills ed. 1994). Justice Thomas has also supported this view.
See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
44 Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L.
REv. 341, 358 (1949).
45 304 U.S. 144 (1938); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
46 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding the relocation of Japanese-Americans during
World War I). As is now universally recognized, this was not Justice Black's finest hour.
Congress has instituted reparations to the victims of the relocation policy. See generally
PETER IRONS, JuSTcE AT WAR (1983) (discussing the history of Japanese-American
internment camps in World War 11).
47 Id. at 216 (emphasis added).48 See id. at 223-24; see also IRONS, supra note 46 at 325-41.
49 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1976).
50 See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973).
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effects and actual purpose of a challenged classification are relevant and indeed
legally dispositive. In contrast, the color-blind theory posits that racial
differentiation is immoral, and in this context unconstitutional, merely because it
is race-conscious. In his dissent in Adarand Constnctors, Inc. v. Pena, Justice
Stevens restates the insight of the modem tradition to explain why this is false:
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is
designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial
subordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating
a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the majority. Remedial
race-based preferences reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality
in society. 51
Color-blindness disregards "the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and
a welcome mat." 52
Two defects of the color-blind view deserve comment. One is that it fails to
grasp what racism is or why it is wrong. In Professor Van Alstyne's revealing
elision, it equates "differential treatment of other human beings by race" with
"racism."'53 The modem tradition rightly rejects this theory, which trades on
the fact that historically such differential treatment has been accompanied by
stigma and motivated by prejudice to brand as racist differential treatment that
is meant to defeat stigma and overcome prejudice. By itself, racial classification
is no more pernicious than classification by athletic ability or home state. If
there were no history of racial oppression, as there is none of the athletically
limited or geographically handicapped, racial differentiation might or might not
be rational, but it would not be racist. What makes it racist, when it is, is
precisely that history and the predicates of racism, prejudice, and stigmatic
harm. Racism, in the modem tradition, is not a matter of distinctions but
degrading discrimination driven by animus.
The other defect is concomitant. Because the color-blind view fails to grasp
the wrong that, in the modem tradition, equal protection seeks to avert, it
cannot grasp the right that equal protection seeks to secure. As Professor
Dworkin explains, this is not equal treatment but "treatment as an equal." 54
The right that equal protection guarantees cannot sensibly be that each person
51 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995). Justice Stevens
attributes the color-blind view to the majority. Justice O'Connor, as noted below in the text,
see infra text accompanying notes 116-17, takes some pains to disavow it.52 Id. at 229.
53 Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 809-10.
54 Ronald Dworkin, Reverse Discrimination, in TAKING RIGHS SERIOUSLY 223, 227
(1977).
1066 [Vol. 58:1055
A NOT QUTE COLOR-BLIND CONS77=TION
shall be treated in exactly the same way, but that no person shall be treated so
as to "suffer from the prejudice and contempt of others." 55 Since no one can
seriously claim that modem racial preference programs reflect prejudice against
whites or subject them to contempt and stigma because of their race, they
should, if otherwise properly designed, raise no equal protection claim.
In sum, it would be a very considerable departure for the Court to adopt a
wholly color-blind approach that never allowed race to be taken into account
except to remedy a pre-existing violation of equal protection. The weight of
precedent is against such a view. Taking race into account in a way that neither
stigmatizes nor reflects prejudice is acceptable to the modem tradition. I dwell
on this not only to exhibit the coherence of the modem tradition and the
consistency of the Burger and early Rehnquist Courts in upholding racial
preference programs, but also to show that Justice O'Connor's views are
informed by the ethical theory that sustains it.
C. Opposing Views on Racial Preference and the Standard of Review
Debate
The Court has been as sharply divided as the country in its deliberations on
whether noninvidious racial preferences are permissible to serve remedial or
other ends. This difference was expressed in the quarter century of debate over
the proper standard of review for racial classifications intended to benefit rather
than disadvantage racial minorities, a debate settled by Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., Adarand Constnctors, and Shaw v. Reno (Shaw 1). The question
was how much deference should be accorded to the policymaking of other
branches of government. In view of America's bleak legacy of official racism,
the courts agree that racial classifications are not entitled to the deferential
review deemed appropriate for most social and economic legislation, requiring
55 Ronald Dworkin, Bakke's Case: Are Quotas Unfair?, in A MATrER oF PRiNciPLE
293, 298 (1985). This should be distinguished from Professor Tribe's "antisubjugation
principle," according to which equal protection does not merely permit but actually requires
race-conscious measures "to break down legally created or legally reenforced [sic] systems of
subordination that treat some people as second-class citizens." LAuRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMEPICAN CONSTrrtuONAL LAW § 16-21, at 1515 (2d ed. 1988). The Court has indeed
sometimes implicitly invoked such a principle in requiring race-conscious measures to remedy
violations of equal protection, say, in upholding school busing, see, e.g., Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 454 (1979), or ordering racial targets in hiring to overcome
egregious discrimination, see, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987). But
it cannot explain the modem tradition, on which voluntary racial preference plans are
permitted but not required.
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only that a classification bear a "rational relation" to a "legitimate"
governmental end. "Invidious" measures that disadvantage minorities on
account of race are "suspect" and face the strictest scrutiny. They must be
"narrowly tailored" to meet a "compelling" governmental interest, and so
rarely survive. What about noninvidious measures of the sort generally upheld
by the Burger and early Rehnquist Courts, but without clear resolution of the
standard of review?
A- more senior group of Justices-Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
White-now all retired from the Court, defended an intermediate standard of
review, used in classifications based on gender56 and illegitimacy, 57 requiring
that the classification be "substantially related" to an "important" governmental
end.58 The senior Justices in Bakke argued that while racial classifications
required some heightened level of scrutiny, those that were benign in purpose
should not be found virtually per se invalid, as they would have been under the
then prevailing understanding of strict scrutiny as "fatal in fact." 59 It may have
been reflected in Fullilove v. Klutznick, which used no clearly articulated
standard of review.6° Intermediate scrutiny was briefly law, at least for federal
racial preferences, under Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,61 reversed in this
respect by Adarand Constructors.62 Justice Stevens originally opposed racial
preference but came to support both it and intermediate scrutiny in his Adarand
Constructors dissent;63 he was joined in this by Justice Ginsburg, which seems
56 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
57 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
58 See, e.g., id.
59 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 256-62 (1978) (opinion of Brennan,
Marshall, White & Blackmun, JJ.).
60 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980). Justice Powell, concurring in the plurality opinion, thought
that Fullilove applied, or at least accorded with, his own favored strict scrutiny standard. See
id. at 495-96. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990), overnded
by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995), the Court read Fullilove as
using intermediate scrutiny and providing precedential support for its own adoption of this
standard in the context of federal racial preference policies.61 497 U.S. at 564-65.
62 515 U.S. at 256.
63 In Bakke, Justice Stevens wrote that Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was
intended by Congress to be color-blind, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 413-16, although he declined
to address the constitutional question or consider whether equal protection itself was color-
blind. Id. at 417. In Adarand Constructors, he dissented from the Court's adoption of a strict
scrutiny standard for all governmental racial classifications, saying that "benign programs
deserve different treatment [from] invidious programs." Adarand Constnctors, 515 U.S. at
243 n.1. See also his remarks quoted supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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to leave them the only two voices on the Court supporting a lower standard of
review in general. The other dissenters in that case, Justices Breyer and Souter,
did not take issue with the holding on the standard of review. 64
Newer justices appointed by Republican Presidents held out for strict
scrutiny. This was Justice Powell's position in Bakke,65 in which he was joined
by no other Justice. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, however, Justice
Powell won a plurality of four-Justices Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and
Chief Justice Burger-for strict scrutiny. 66 Justice Powell, however, clearly did
not understand this strict scrutiny to be fatal. In Wygant he said, "We have
recognized... that in order to remedy the effects of prior discrimination, it
may be necessary to take race into account. "67 His opinion in Bakke stated that
affirmative action in educational admissions could pass constitutional muster
under certain conditions. 68 He concurred in Fullilove.69 In both Wygant and
Bakke, he insisted on findings by competent authorities of governmental
discrimination as a condition for a legitimate racial preference, indicating that
there could be such preference.70
A minority of Republican appointees followed Justice Powell as to strict
scrutiny, but rejected his position that racial preferences are constitutional.
Adopting color-blindness, they regarded race-conscious measures as per se
invalid unless necessary to remedy a constitutional violation. Justice Scalia said:
The benign purpose of compensating for social disadvantages, whether they
have been acquired by reason of prior discrimination or otherwise, can no
more be pursued by the illegitimate means of racial discrimination than can
other assertedly benign purposes we have repeatedly rejected.... IThere is
only one circumstance in which the states may act by race to "undo the effects
of past discrimination": where that is necessary to eliminate their own
64 See Adarand Constrtors, 515 U.S. at 265 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("I would not
have entertained [the standard of review] question in this case."). In Shaw L Justice Souter
suggests that he would treat electoral districting cases differently from nondistricting cases,
using lower scrutiny in districting cases. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 684-85 (Souter,
J., dissenting). In Vera, he joins with Justice Ginsburg in Justice Stevens' dissent, agreeing on
this point. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1978 (1996).
65 See 438 U.S. at 307-08.
66 See 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, O'Connor, & Powell,
JJ.) (invalidating a minority-favoring layoff policy for public school teachers).67 Id. at 280.
68 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-18.
69 See supra note 60.
70 See ygant, 476 U.S. at 276-78; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308-10.
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maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification. 71
Justice Kennedy wrote in Croson that he would prefer Justice Scalia's
theory, creating "a rule of automatic invalidity for racial preferences in almost
every case," but that since that would depart from precedent, "we need [not]
adopt it at this point" if strict scrutiny would have nearly that effect.72 Justice
Kennedy elsewhere equated the racial preferences for minority broadcasters
sustained in Metro Broadcasting with the segregated rail cars upheld in Plessy
and with the former South African regime's Apartheid system. 73 However, he
joined in Justice O'Connor's opinion in Adarand Constructors, which, as we
shall see, embodies a far less negative appraisal of racial preference. This may
reflect a shift in his views since 1989-1990.
Justice Thomas, speaking to the remark of Justice Stevens quoted above,74
said that "[s]o-called 'benign' discrimination" is "paternalis[t]" and
"patronizing" as well as "poisonous" and "pernicious."75 He wrote: "I believe
that there is a 'moral [and] constitutional equivalence'.... between laws
designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of
race ... to foster some current notion of equality .... In each instance, [this is
noxious] racial discrimination, plain and simple."76
At least two Justices, then, clearly maintain the color-blind theory. Justice
Kennedy once did, although he may have changed his mind. Chief Justice
Rehnquist opposes any racial preferences, voting to strike them down or
dissenting when they are upheld on all occasions. He has not, however, made
any significant pronouncements of his own on the subject, although he has
recently endorsed Justice O'Connor's views in principle.77
71 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520, 524 (1989) (Scalia J.,
concurring).
72 Id. at 518-19.
73 See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630, 635 (1990) (Kennedy & Scalia,
JJ., dissenting).
74 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
75 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J.
concurring).76 Id. at 240-41 (Thomas J., concurring).
77 See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1907 (1996) (Shaw I]) (opinion of Rehnquist,
C.J.) (striking down a race-conscious districting plan). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "A
State's interest in remedying the effects of past or present racial discrimination may in the
proper case justify a government's use of racial distinctions." Id. at 1902.
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IH. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE OF RACE
A. The Pivotal Vote in a Divided Court
Where on this spectrum does Justice O'Connor fall? The current Court,
like the Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, is split 4-4 on
racial preferences. The dissenters in Adarand Constructors, Shaw v. Hunt
(Shaw //)78 and related voting cases79-Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Stevens-indicate that there are four solid votes to uphold such preferences in
some circumstances, opposed by at least three and perhaps four solid votes to
strike them down in any circumstances. In this situation, Justice O'Connor's
vote will carry the day. She has generally voted against particular programs,
dissenting even in United States v. Paradise.80 But the question is whether her
position is that racial preference is ipso facto unconstitutional or merely that the
particular programs that the Court has considered fail to satisfy constitutional
constraints. In theory, the answer is clearly the latter.
The later Rehnquist Court's retrenchment from the Burger Court's
tolerance of racial preference shows that the composition of the Court matters
in the fate of the policy. Justice Stevens and Justice Rehnquist are the likeliest
candidates for soonest retirement. If their replacements are appointed by
President Clinton or a Democratic successor, the Court is likely to tilt in favor
of noninvidious racial preference; if by a Republican successor, it will tilt
against, but in either case the Court will be bound by precedent. What that
precedent says is effectively determined by what Justice O'Connor has written
in her key opinions, Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., Adarand Constructors, and
78 Id. In Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658-87 (1993) (Shaw 1), the dissenters included
Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter.
79 See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1963 (1996) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.)
(striking down a Texas plan); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (opinion of Kennedy,
J.) (striking down a race-conscious Georgia districting plan).
80 480 U.S. 146, 196 (1987). This case would seem to meet even Justice Scalia's high
standards for a racial preference program, although he predictably dissented. Justice Powell
concurred. The State of Alabama had never hired a Black state trooper. The discriminatory
conduct was "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate." Id. at 167. In 1972 a district court
ordered that a qualified Black must be promoted for every white until the violation was cured,
and the Supreme Court affirmed. Justice O'Connor, however, objected that while some race-
conscious remedy was appropriate, "the Court adopts a standardless view of 'narrowly
tailored' far less stringent than that required by strict scrutiny." Id. at 197. Further, she
rejected the district court's use of the strict quota as not "manifestly necessary." Id. Justice
O'Connor now appears to be reconciled to the Court's holding in Paradise. See infra note 116
and accompanying text.
1997] 1071
OHIO STATELAWJOURNAL
Shaw v. Reno (Shaw 1), and as illuminated by her views elsewhere.
Justice O'Connor's view, as befits a moderate centrist, is moderate and
centrist. Shaw I aside, it generally respects the traditional view that the wrong
of racism is the harm that it causes and the animus that motivates it rather than
the bare fact of racial differentiation itself. In Croson, she adopted the "equal
dignity and respect" interpretation of equal protection urged above.81 She
emphasized the "danger of stigmatic harm"82 and said in defense of the strict
scrutiny standard that without it "there is simply no way of determining what
classifications are 'benign' ... and what classifications are... motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority." 83
Accordingly, she allows for taking race into account in some
circumstances. In an early statement, she said, "We ought not delude ourselves
that the deep faith that race should never be relevant has completely triumphed
over the painful social reality that, sometimes, it may be.",84 In Adarand
Constntctors she said, "When race based action is necessary to further a
compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies
the 'narrow tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases." 85 In Shaw 1,
she expressly rejected an appeal to the first Justice Harlan's "color-blind[ness],"
saying, "This Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is
81 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). This language is a very
close paraphrase of Professor Dworkin's analysis of equal protection as involving "the right
to treatment as an equal... [i.e., treatment] with the same respect and concern as anyone
else." DWORIuCN, supra note 54, at 227. This shows that Justice O'Connor did operate within
the ethical framework of the modem tradition. Justice O'Connor also refused to dismiss,
except as a justification for a lower standard of review than strict scrutiny, Professor Ely's
Carolene Products thesis that the purpose of equal protection is to protect minorities against
majoritarian prejudice, so that "these concerns are not implicated when the 'white majority'
places burdens upon itself." Croson, 488 U.S. at 495. Neither did she endorse this reasoning.
She merely remarked that it was inapplicable in Richmond, a city with a majority-Black
population. Id.
82 Id. at 493. Here she was worried about harm to the beneficiaries of racial preference
policies.
83 Id.
84 Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941 (1981) (concurring in denial of
certiorari). Compare Justice O'Connor's statement with Justice Powell's statement in Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986), at supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
85 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24 (1995); accord Croson,
488 U.S. at 509 ("Nothing we say today precludes a state or local entity from taking action to
rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its jurisdiction.").
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impermissible in all circumstances."8 6
Her position closely tracks that of Justice Powell, who argued in Bakke
both that racial classifications require strict scrutiny and that affirmative action
was permissible to further both remedial and (in higher education) nonremedial
goals. The holding in that case was not merely that the University of California,
Davis Medical School affirmative action program violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VI, but also that the California Supreme Court erred in
prohibiting race from being taken into account in admissions decisions.87 This
doctrine both permits and limits the use of race-conscious remedies to
overcome the effects of discrimination. Justice O'Connor is in the position of
Justice Powell both strategically, as the pivotal vote in a divided Court, and
doctrinally, in adopting and developing the main lines of his position.
I proceed as follows. First, I discuss the meaning of this new strict scrutiny
standard, arguing that it is broadly congruent with the modem tradition in equal
protection jurisprudence canvassed above and it is inconsistent with a color-
blind analysis. Then, I turn to the question of whether Justice O'Connor's
emphasis on the importance of the remedial character of permissible racial
preferences comports with Bakke's allowance that nonremedial interests such as
diversity may be sufficiently compelling to satisfy that standard. I suggest that
Justice O'Connor's position may well comport with Bakke. Finally, I take up
her discussion of race-conscious districting in Shaw I and related cases, which
some have thought supports a color-blind reading of equal protection. I argue
that it does not.
86 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (Shaw 1) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan J., dissenting)).87 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1978). The Fifth
Circuit panel in Hopwood v. Texas held that is not and never has been a rule of law, but
represents only Justice Powell's individual opinion, because the Bakke Court split 4-4-1, with
Justice Powell's opinion, not joined by any other Justice, deciding the case. See 78 F.3d 932,
944 (5th Cir. 1995). This controls in the Fifth Circuit, but it is plainly wrong. "The holding
of the Court [in a divided case] may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977). In Bakke, the Brennan group would have supported intermediate review and
allowed a far wider scope for affirmative action than Justice Powell, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at
325 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun & White, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
while the Stevens group would have ruled out affirmative action on statutory grounds and did
not reach the constitutional issue, see id. at 421 (Stevens, Rehnquist, Stewart, JJ. & Burger,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell's opinion therefore states the
narrowest grounds for supporting affirmative action in principle, and, outside the Fifth
Circuit, it is law.
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B. Croson and Adarand Constructors: Strict Scrutiny for All Racial
Classifications
1. Croson and State Racial Classifications
Justice O'Connor's elaboration of the Powell view was most fully
articulated in her key opinions in Croson and Adarand Constructors which
establish a strict scrutiny standard for all racial classifications whatever their
purpose. These cases concern minority business set-asides ("MBEs") and racial
preference in government contracting. In the first, Justice O'Connor won a
majority to the strict scrutiny view for state governmental racial preferences,
even if they are meant to benefit rather than burden minorities. The Court
rejected a "two standard" view for the states. 88 In the second, this view was
extended to federal race-conscious classifications, overturning Metro
Broadcasting, which had briefly established intermediate scrutiny as the
appropriate standard with respect to federal racial preferences, and, implicitly,
perhaps overturning Fullilove if that case in effect used a standard lower than
strict scrutiny.89
In Croson, Justice O'Connor rejected the "stark alternatives" that a
governmental unit either "must limit any race-based remedial efforts to
eradicating ... its own prior discrimination" or that it enjoys "sweeping
legislative power to define and attack the effects of prior discrimination." 90 The
first is the view of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and, at least at the time, of Kennedy
and probably of Chief Justice Rehnquist. The second is that of the Brennan
group in Bakke. Justice O'Connor attempted in effect to steer between the
Scylla of Justice Scalia's color-blindness and the Charybdis of the Brennan
view.91 The proper balance requires strict scrutiny to "'smoke out' illegitimate
uses of race," 92 while permitting race-conscious measures if the governmental
unit could establish a "prima facie case of discrimination," documented by
evidence, of public participation even in private discrimination. 93
88 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94. Justice Powell called this view a "two-class
theory." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295-97.
89 SeeAdarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 200, 226.
90 Croson, 488 U.S. at 486.
91 Scylla is a mythical many-headed man-eating monster that lurked in a cave by
Charybdis, a terrible whirlpool that sucked in passing ships. Odysseus had to steer through
them on his way home from Troy. See Tim ODYSSEY OF HomR xii, at 80-110 (Richmond
Lattimore tram. 1967).
92 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
93 Id. at 503-04.
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What, in Justice O'Connor's view, do the compelling interest and narrow
tailoring conditions of this strict scrutiny test require? In Croson, she said that
the compelling interest prong means that permissible classification based on
race must be "strictly reserved for remedial settings." 94 Following Justice
Powell, she wrote that what is governmentally remediable by racial preference
is only identified governmental discrimination, not "societal" discrimination,
that is, discrimination in which governmental action is not implicated. 95 Like
Justice Powell, she derived this requirement not doctrinally from the state action
doctrine associated with the Fourteenth Amendment but from the ethical and
policy grounds that remedial use of racial classifications against societal
discrimination is "'too amorphous a basis"' and "'ageless in [its] reach into the
past, and timeless in [its] ability to affect the future.' ' 96 The concern is that
such remedies be sharply limited in the evils they are used to correct, because
even used remedially, racial classifications compromise the "'personal rights'"
of all citizens to be treated "with equal dignity and respect" regardless of
race. 97 "[D]eviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial... groups,"
Justice O'Connor said, must be "a temporary matter [and undertaken] in the
service of... equality itself."98
Accordingly, race-conscious remedies must be justified by particularized
findings of the appropriate kind of discrimination to show that there is a
compelling interest of the required sort.99 In Croson, Justice O'Connor found
that Richmond's recitation of remedial purpose and a conclusory "generalized
assertion" of racial discrimination "'in this area, and the State, and around the
nation"' (in places such as Pittsburgh) were no substitute for particularized
findings. 100 Likewise, mere statistical disparities in awarding more contracts to
whites than their proportion in the area population would not substitute for a
showing that qualified minorities were being disproportionately disfavored.1 01
94 Id. at 493. However, she cites here to Justice Powell's opinion in Regents ofthe Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978), which expressly found the nonremedial goal of
diversity to be a compelling interest. I defer consideration of the prospects for nonremedial
interests under the new standard to Part III (C).
95 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 497-98 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (opinion of Powell,
J.) and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
96 Croson, 488 U.S. at 497-98 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308); see also Wygant, 476
U.S. at 276.
97 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).98 Id. at 510.
99 See id. (opinion of Powell, J.) (citing Bakke, 488 U.S. at 308-09).
100 See id. at 500 (quoting the statements of Coundilperson Marsh and City Manager
Deese).
101 See id. at 501-02.
1997] 1075
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Finally, she said that Congressional findings of discrimination on a national
level that might warrant a federal program like that approved in Fullilove under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be invoked by a state or
municipal government in lieu of a finding of discrimination in "its own
bailiwick."'102
The kind of discrimination that, when established by a proper showing,
Justice O'Connor held may be remedied by racial classification is not narrowly
governmental. This is an important difference between Justice Powell and
Justice O'Connor. Outside the context of higher education, Justice Powell
would have prohibited racial preferences except as a limited remedy for
identified acts of discrimination by the particular governmental actor in
question. "Mhe court has insisted [on] some showing of prior discrimination
by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial
classifications."'103 This is a narrower and more restrictive view than saying that
there is no compelling interest in remedying "societal" discrimination, i.e.,
discrimination by non-state actors. 104 The latter would allow race-conscious
governmental action to remedy the racial discrimination of other state actors
and of private actors significantly involved with the state. The former would
not.
Justice O'Connor rejected the narrower position. In Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, she observed that "contemporaneous findings of actual
discrimination" should not be required "[s]o long as the public actor has a firm
basis for believing that remedial action is required" and that "a plan need not be
limited to the remedying of specific instances of identified discrimination for it
to be deemed sufficiently 'narrowly tailored."' 105 She worried there that Justice
Powell's requirement would be unreasonable because a governmental unit
might be unwilling to admit that it had discriminated. 10 6 In Croson, Justice
O'Connor said that evidence that private white contractors were systematically
excluding minorities could provide a basis for "racial preference ... to break
10 2 Id. at 504. Section 5 says, "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 5. In
Adarand Constructors, however, she seems to backtrack froih the position that Congress has
special powers under § 5, as discussed below. See infra notes 138-39, 143 and accompanying
text. 103 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (emphasis added).
104 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-08 (opinion of Powell, J.).
105 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286-87.
106 See id. at 290-91 (If such findings "were required... in every case .... the
relative value of these evidentiary advantages would diminish .... [The requirement] would
severely undermine public employers' incentive to meet voluntarily their civil rights
obligations.").
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down patterns of deliberate exclusion"107 and even that a "significant statistical
disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors" and contracts
awarded could license "an inference of discriminatory exclusion., 1 08
The narrow tailoring condition for an acceptable racial preference received
little elucidation in Croson because Justice O'Connor found no compelling
interest to which the MBE program could have been narrowly tailored.109 But
she suggested a number of points that a narrowly tailored plan should satisfy
under her strict scrutiny test. First, race-neutral alternatives must be considered
and shown to be inferior to a racial preference program. 1 0 Second, any targets
must be tied to attaining the compelling interest. Richmond's 30% minority set-
aside, she thought, was either arbitrary or involved the impermissible goal of
attaining racial proportionality in each trade based on the "completely
unrealistic" assumption that members of different races would, ceteris paribus,
participate proportionally to their percentage in the population. 111 More
helpfully, she suggested that a narrowly tailored program should make
provision for individualized treatment. The federal set-aside approved in
Fullilove had a waiver when a minority contractor's higher price was not
attributable to effects of discrimination, but the Richmond program made no
inquiry as to whether a particular minority contractor seeking a racial
preference had suffered from discrimination. 1 2 Finally, she noted that a
narrowly tailored plan should not be overinclusive. Copying the language of the
program approved in Fulilove, Richmond had defined "minority" to include
Eskimos or Aleut persons. As Justice O'Connor noted, there was no evidence
107 Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
108 Id.
109 See id. at 507.
110 See id.
111 Id. This objection involves an unproductively atomistic approach to the effects of
racial discrimination. Surely Justice O'Connor cannot mean that a goal or target must identify
the proportion in each field in which minorities would be represented absent discrimination.
There is simply no way to guess what that might be. In a nonracist society Blacks might be
disproportionately concentrated in, say, electrical contracting over plumbing or law over
medicine. But in a racially discriminatory one, the problem is that they are disproportionately
globally excluded from most opportunities and advantages available to whites. If our goal is to
overcome this global disadvantage, then something like rough proportionality is not
unreasonable on the plausible assumption that minorities and whites as individuals are not
inherently dissimilar, so that in a nonracist society, any deviation from proportionality would
be adventitious.
112 See id. at 508. This tracks Justice Powell's insistence on individualized treatment in
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978) (raking race as only a
"plus" factor among others in university admissions "treats each applicant as an individual.").
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of discrimination against these groups: "It may well be that Richmond has
never had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen.... If [the program] was 'narrowly
tailored' to compensate black[s]... for past discrimination,... why [are]
they... forced to share this 'remedial relief with an Aleut citizen who moves
to Richmond tomorrow?"1 13
This examination of Croson should make it evident that Justice O'Connor's
"newest" equal protection jurisprudence is anything but color-blind. Although
more rigorous than the theory urged by Justice Brennan and more demanding
in its application than that used by the Burger and early Rehnquist Courts, it is,
in fact, less strict than Justice Powell's version of the strict scrutiny standard for
remedial racial preferences in its requirements for findings and its allowance of
some private discrimination as a basis for race-conscious remedies. Far from
offering any endorsement of Justice Scalia's austere denunciation of almost any
racial preference, most of Justice O'Connor's analysis in Croson involved
detailed directions about how to design an acceptable state or local racial
preference program in circumstances where governmental involvement in
discrimination can be shown.
2. Adarand Constructors and Federal Racial Classifications
In Croson, Justice O'Connor offered only a brief defense of the adoption of
the strict scrutiny standard. 114 In Adarand Constructors, she offered a more
elaborated explanation of its basis and meaning. Here Justice O'Connor
explicitly addressed the concern, raised by Justice Stevens in his dissent, that
the new strict scrutiny standard, despite her protestations, effectively adopts a
color-blind interpretation of the Constitution that leaves no room for
noninvidious racial preferences. 1 5 Justice O'Connor replied:
[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory but fatal in
fact.' ... The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups is an unfortunate
reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it. 116
Lest it be thought that the government may only act when Justice Scalia
113 Croson, 488 U.S. at 506.
114 See id. at 493-95.
115 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 242-48 (1995); see also
supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. The program considered here was not invalidated,
but the case was remanded for further consistent proceedings. See id. at 238-39.
116 Id. at 228 (citation omitted). The example she gave is United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149 (1987), in which she dissented. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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might approve, Justice O'Connor explained that while strict scrutiny involves
searching judicial inquiry into the proffered justification for a racial
classification, it does not mean treating as equivalent those classifications that
benefit and those that burden minorities. The point of the single high standard is
mainly to ensure that the recitations of benign purpose are genuine and justified:
[Justice Stevens]... allows that 'nothing is inherently wrong in applying a
single standard to fundamentally different situations [that is, invidious
discrimination versus racial preference that promotes equality] as long as that
standard takes relevant differences into account.'... [But] strict scrutiny does
take 'relevant differences' into account-indeed that is its fundamental purpose.
The point of carefully examining the interest asserted by the government in
support of a racial classification, and the evidence offered to show that the
classification is needed, is precisely to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate
uses of race in governmental decisionmaking. n7
Therefore, government is not disqualified from acting in response to the
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination, and there are
legitimate uses of race in governmental decisionmaking.
In her dissent in Metro Broadcasting, Justice O'Connor did say, "' [b]enign'
racial classification is a contradiction in terms." 1 8 But her point there is that the
lower standard of review authorized lends itself to improper politicization, not
that all such classifications are equally invidious. She said:
Untethered to narrowly confined remedial notions, "benign" carries with it no
independent meaning, but reflects only acceptance of the current generation's
conclusion that a politically acceptable burden, imposed on particular citizens
because of race, is reasonable. The Court provides no basis for determining
when a racial classification fails to be "benevolent." 119
The objection seems to be to the use of the word "benign" rather than to
remedial use of racial preference per se. Justice O'Connor's point was not that
there is no such thing as noninvidious racial classification, as Justices Scalia or
Thomas would say, but first, that for such a classification to be acceptable, it
must normally be tied to narrowly confined remedial notions (at least outside
higher education); and second, that there must be clear standards for what
counts as a "benevolent" classification, or at least a nonbenevolent one.
117 Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 237.
118 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 609 (1990), overrded by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
119 Id. at 609-10.
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What, however, is the rationale for adopting the new standard? Justice
O'Connor said in Adarand Constructors that the strictness of the scrutiny for all
racial classifications derives from two concerns, one epistemological and the
other methodological, neither of which are substantive views about the
supposedly color-blind content of equal protection. Whatever the merits of and
problems created by Justice O'Connor's particular arguments for the new
standard, these sources of the new doctrine underline that the new strict scrutiny
standard is not motivated by a view that racial preference is per se morally
wrong or even constitutionally problematic, but rather is motivated, at least in
part, by rather abstract considerations about constitutional interpretation.
a. Skepticism
Justice O'Connor called the epistemological concern "skepticism.' 1 20 The
question is how to tell whether a racial classification in fact serves a legitimate
purpose. It descends from Justice Powell's observation in Bakke that "'it may
not always be so clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign. "121 "Absent
searching judicial inquiry," said Justice O'Connor, "there is simply no way of
determining what classifications are 'benign'... and what classifications
are.., motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or racial
politics."' 122 She was unwilling to credit "mere recitation of a benign
compensatory purpose" or allow that to protect "against any inquiry into the
actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme." 123
Although it is not my purpose to criticize the new standard nor to argue for
its replacement with intermediate review, it may be observed that this argument
is not strong, at least with respect to the concern that the kinds of racial
preference policies involved in Adarand Constructors and Croson might
conceal views that whites are inferior to minorities. It is not hard to discern that
minority racial preferences reflect neither prejudice against whites nor are
meant to impose any stigma of inferiority or degradation upon them, nor is it
obvious that the high hurdle of strict scrutiny is necessary to determine the
purpose behind a minority preference program. As Justice Stevens plausibly
argued, it cannot be harder to tell when a classification fails to be benevolent
than when some behavior is "intentionally" discriminatory as opposed to
merely having a discriminatory effect-the standard in determining whether
120 Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 223.
121 Id. at 226 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.)).
122 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
123 Id. at 495 (quoting Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)).
1080 [Vol. 58:1055
A NOT QUITE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION
discrimination is invidious at all. 124 Simply from a logical point of view, the
epistemological concern about smoking out hidden racial prejudice only calls
for intermediate scrutiny.
Justice O'Connor further displayed an odd solicitousness about the dangers
of stigmatization of the beneficiaries of racial preference programs, 125 a
concern that no minority plaintiff has ever raised, while comparatively slighting
the harmful effects in terms of opportunities denied to minorities by historical
and ongoing discrimination in which government has been significantly
implicated. As Justice Stevens remarked in Adarand Constructors, "[Ihis is
not an argument that petitioner [Adarand Constructors, a white-owned business]
has standing to advance. No beneficiaries of the specific program under attack
today [a minority set-aside in government contracting] have challenged its
constitutionality-perhaps because they do not find it stigmatizing .... -126
This is a signal point of fundamental importance which should entirely
undermine the legal status of the stigma argument against minority racial
preference unless advanced by a minority beneficiary of such a program.
Theoretical issues aside, Justice O'Connor's application of "skepticism" in
both Croson and Adarand Constraors is quite troubling. In Croson, Justice
O'Connor worried that a municipal set-aside designed for a majority-Black city
where Blacks held a majority of Council seats might be a form of "racial
politics," in which Blacks were attempting to "negotiate 'a piece of the action"'
for their own group. 127 As Justice Marshall observed in his dissent, this
concern pales beside Richmond's sordid history of official discrimination,
attempts to frustrate Brown, and to deny Blacks political representation. 128 How
racial politics might have operated in the overwhelmingly white United States
Congress, which approved the program considered in Adarand Constnctors,
Justice O'Connor did not explain. Apart from this, there is Justice O'Connor's
curious substitution of groundless speculation that racial politics might have
been at work in Croson for searching judicial inquiry into whether it was in fact
at work. If it had been, that would be problematic, but we have no reason to
think that it was. One would have hoped for more in the way of careful
examination of the asserted interest.
124 See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 245-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (opinion of Powell,
126 Adarand Construcors, 515 U.S. at 248 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127 Croson, 488 U.S. at 510-11.
128 See id. at 544 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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b. Consistency
The methodological as well as the epistemological concerns behind the new
strict scrutiny standard also descend from Justice Powell. They turn on his
conviction that "constitutional standards [must] be applied consistently: Political
judgments regarding the necessity for the particular classification may be
weighed in the constitutional balance, but the standard of justification will
remain constant." 129 Justice O'Connor termed the related concerns
"consistency," the idea that there is a single standard of review independent of
the race of the person burdened, and "congruence," that equal protection is the
same under the Fifth as under the Fourteenth Amendment. 130 Equal protection
applies equally and in the same way to all races. 131 This suggests that Justice
O'Connor's concern was that "the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean
one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another color." 132 This might square with Justice Blackmun's
observation in Bakke that, "[I]n order to treat some persons equally, we must
treat them differently."'1 33 In any event, Justice O'Connor insisted that
consistency "says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law." 134
The argument from consistency provides a far better rationale for a strict
scrutiny standard for all racial classifications than does the argument from
skepticism. Clearly strict scrutiny is in order for invidious racial classifications
meant to burden minorities. If equal protection should mean the same thing
129 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (opinion of Powell, J.) (citation omitted).
130 Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 224.
131 See id. The Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states. Equal protection was
extended to apply to the federal government in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954),
the companion case to Brown desegregating the District of Columbia public schools. In that
case, the Court in effect implied an equal protection requirement into the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, which constrains the federal government. See also Weinberger v.
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 (1975) (holding that § 402(g) of the Social Security Act
violated due process because it unjustifiably provided widowers less protection than widows).
132 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90 (opinion of Powell, J.).
133 Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The appearance
of paradox in this statement will be dispelled by reflection on Professor Dworkin's distinction
between equal treatment and treatment as an equal. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
As Aristotle remarked, we do not give a trained athlete and a beginner the same food: what is
neither "too much nor too little" relative to us "is not one, nor the same for all." ARSrOTLE,
NICOMAcHEAN ETncs ii.6, 1106a31-1106b5 (W.D. Ross trans.), in THE BASIc WORKS OF
ARTmET (Richard McKeon ed. 1941).
134 Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 230.
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when applied to anyone, a plausible if not unquestionable proposition, 135 then
strict scrutiny should be applied whenever anyone is classified by race for
whatever reason. This does not require equal treatment of all persons, pace
Justice Scalia: Justice O'Connor was quite clear that relevant differences are to
be taken into account. Strict scrutiny is flexible enough to allow this if we can
take Justice O'Connor at her word that the new standard is not "strict in theory
but fatal in fact." 136
Justice Stevens objected that Justice O'Connor's approach implied that
"'strict scrutiny' means something different-something less than strict-when
applied to benign racial classifications." 1 37 This is argumentative. The same
standard can pass a benevolent classification because it is benevolent and flunk
an invidious one because it is invidious. The point of applying the standard is to
distinguish one from the other. Justice Stevens may be right that "there is a
danger that the fatal language of 'strict scrutiny' may skew the analysis and
place well-crafted benign programs at unnecessary risk.' 138 Arguably it did so
in Adarand Constructors. If this danger is to be avoided, Justice O'Connor must
make it even more clear than she has, in application as well as in
representation, that the notion of strict scrutiny has been redefined.
c. Congruence
The argument from congruence is far more problematic, both in terms of
Justice O'Connor's own reasoning in Croson and in terms of the language of
the Fourteenth Amendment itself. She distinguished the invalid municipal
minority set-asides in Croson from the federal ones upheld in Fullilove by the
argument that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress "unique
powers" to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, 139 which are not granted to
state and local governments. 14 As Justice O'Connor acknowledged in her
discussion of stare decisis in Adarand Constructors, this creates some tension
with the Adarand Constructors-imposed "congruence" between the equal
135 The arguments against it were extensively presented by the losing side in the
standards of review debate, e.g., in the opinions of the Brennan group in Bakke, see supra
note 59 and accompanying text, as well as in the literature of legal scholarship during that
period, see e.g., Ely, Constitutionaity, supra note 36; ELY, DEMOCRACY supra note 36;
TRIE, supra note 55.
136 Adarad Constructors, 515 U.S. at 237.
137 Id. at 243 n.1 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
138 Id.
139 See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 488, 490 (1989).
140 See id. at 490-91.
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protection standards under the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. 141 Her
argument that the Court is only correcting a recent error, not digging out a
"long-established precedent that has become integrated into the fabric of the
law," 142 when it overruled Metro Broadcasting and its intermediate review for
federal racial preferences is doubly doubtful.
First, there is the precedent of Fullilove itself, which, while it did not turn
on any clearly stated traditional standard of review, cannot be easily
distinguished from the set-aside challenged in Adarand Constructors. Justice
O'Connor did not attempt to distinguish them. She said only, "[11o the extent
that Fulilove held federal racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous
standard [than strict scrutiny], it is no longer controlling. But we need not
decide today whether the program upheld in Fullilove would survive." 143
Second, it is unclear under Justice O'Connor's "congruence" doctrine, what
remains of Congress's "unique powers" to enforce equal protection under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is a matter of some consequence,
given the weight of precedent-United States v. Guest, Katzenbach v. Morgan,
and Oregon v. Mitchell, among other cases-supporting the idea that Congress
may act under Section 5 to do things it could not do under Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment standing alone. 144 Surely Justice O'Connor did not
intend Adarand Constructors to overrule this line of cases. But their status is
now unclear, as is the meaning of Section 5.145
141 See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 229-35.
142 Id. at 233.
143 Id. at 235.
144 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), restricted congressional powers under
§ 5 to the reach of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment standing alone. In United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762, 782 (1966), six Justices agreed that Congress could go beyond
that. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court held that § 5 granted
Congress "the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause." Id. at 650.
This doctrine was restricted in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), only to the extent of
reserving to the courts the power to determine the boundaries of equal protection. See id. at
240, 280-81.
145 Neither are they much illuminated by the Court's recent pronouncement in a case
concerning the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, City of Boerne v. Mores, 117
S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997), that under § 5, Congress "has been given the power 'to enforce,'
not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." Id. Justice O'Connor,
dissenting in that case, nonetheless agreed with this somewhat opaque formula. See id. at
2176. Absent an explanation of what counts as "enforcement" and what as "determination,"
it offers Congress little guidance as to the scope and limits of its powers under § 5, except that
these are merely "remedial" and not "substantive." Id. at 2167. Two things appear clear after
Fores, however: Katzenbach and the related cases are left undisturbed as legitimate
1084 [Vol. 58:1055
A NOT QUITE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION
Whatever the merits and problems of Justice O'Connor's particular
arguments for the new standard, their thrust is clear. The new standard does not
mean that equal protection is color-blind. On the contrary, it represents an
attempt to ensure that a consistently high but not fatal degree of scrutiny is
applied in all cases to determine whether a given racial preference program can
avoid the problems that invalidate invidious discrimination. That some such
programs could in principle do so is beyond question.
3. Personal Rights
A comment is in order on Justice O'Connor's idea that equal protection is
primarily a "personal" right, a notion more closely aligned with the color-blind
view than with the modem tradition, and which may help explain some of the
tensions in Justice O'Connor's articulation and application of the new standard.
Her invocation of the "personal rights" notion shows that the moral theory
underlying the color-blindness she rejects nonetheless exerts a certain pull on
her views. Like Justice Powell, she thought that "[t]he rights created by
the ... Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual.
The rights established are personal rights." 146 The Fourteenth Amendment
"protect[s] persons, not groups."'147 This is a rather puzzling claim.
First, while the Fourteenth Amendment, does by its plain language protect
individual persons, the object of equal protection analysis is the legitimacy of a
proposed group classification and only derivatively the rights of the person to
whom the classification is applied. The basic issue is whether some
classification to which an individual is subject satisfies the appropriate standard
of review. If it does, then that person's rights have been respected, and if it
does not, then they have not. But the very starting point is the individual as a
member of the group. Consider in contrast our privacy rights under the Fourth
"enforcement" of Fourteenth Amendment rights, id. at 2166-67, but Congress is said to have
no power to "'expand[ ]' the rights contained in § 1," id. at 2168. A plausible guess at what
this means is that at least outside the voting rights sphere and almost certainly with regard to
affirmative action and racial preference generally, Congress will be found to lack the power to
act where the Court has not determined beforehand that a right exists. Had Fores been
decided before Adarand Constructors, though, Congress might have pointed to Fullilove as an
cc ante basis approved by the Court for a legislative power to act. Therefore, Congress might
well worry that even with such a basis it might be found afterwards to have exceeded its
powers if it relies on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
146 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (quoted in Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.), and in Richmond v. IA. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
147Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227.
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Amendment, where the issue is whether this person has been subject to an
unreasonable search. Fourth Amendment privacy is a genuinely personal right.
Equal protection, on the other hand, means treating those similarly situated
alike, 148 which requires attention to their group characteristics. If those are
ignored, we have the color-blind notion that all persons should be treated
exactly alike, or at any rate without taking into account whether race makes
them dissimilarly situated.
Second, if the worry is Justice Powell's concern that an acceptable race-
conscious classification "treats each [person] as an individual" so that he is "not
foreclosed from all consideration... simply because he was not the right
color," 149 we face the problem that it is impossible to treat people "as
individuals" regardless of their group characteristics. Purely merit-based
university admissions as traditionally conceived, for instance, involve
differential treatment by intellectual ability. Justice O'Connor's demand in
Croson for evidence of discrimination against qualified minority contractors150
referred to another group characteristic. If the problem is that race, unlike
intellectual ability or construction skills, is an impermissible basis for
differential treatment, it must be asked why that is. Discrimination on the basis
of race from prejudice or to convey stigmatic harm is wrong and illegal, but
why is racial differentiation directed at overcoming such prejudice and stigma
problematic?
The "personal rights" conception is an individualistic reading of equal
protection that is at odds with the "similarly situated" notion implicit in the
modern tradition. It is linked to the color-blind ideal that individuals should be
regarded as such without concern for their race, regardless of whether race
makes them dissimilarly situated. The gravitational attraction of this theory,
which Justice O'Connor rejected when she reflected on it, emerges, for
example, in her rejection of proportionality as a goal, discussed above, and in
her animadversions on "minority perspectives" addressed below. It may
account for her tendency to apply her own standard more restrictively than the
standard itself demands. Of course, rejecting this notion does not mean that
attention to individuals does not matter. It is individuals who are entitled to be
148 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (stating,
in a case involving retarded and nonretarded persons, that "the Equal Protection Clause... is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike"); accord
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (stating the same in a case involving children of
U.S. citizens and of illegal aliens).
149 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
150 See supra notes 100, 107 and accompanying text.
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treated with "equal dignity and respect." 151 But the point of the modem
tradition is that such treatment of individuals requires attention to their group
characteristics, treating those similarly situated similarly and those dissimilarly
situated, dissimilarly.
C. The Metro Broadcasting Dissent and the Status of Bakke
The emphasis on narrowly remedial purposes in Justice O'Connor's
opinions raises questions about the status of racial preferences in higher
education. 152 As currently understood, these depend on the racial "diversity"
rationale in Bakke, which Justice Powell found to be "compelling" enough to
pass strict scrutiny. 153 Has Justice O'Connor in fact adopted the view that only
remedial purposes can be compelling and that forward-looking, non-remedial
rationales like diversity cannot? The answer is unclear. In Wygant, Justice
O'Connor said, "[A] state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been
found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher education, to
support use of racial considerations in furthering that interest."1 54 But there is
harsh language in her Metro Broadcasting dissent savaging diversity in
telecommunications: "Modem equal protection doctrine has recognized only
one [compelling state] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimination.
[I]ncreasing the diversity of broadcasts is clearly not a compelling interest." 155
On the other hand, Bakke is absolutely central to Justice O'Connor's thinking
about equal protection and racial preference. Her theory is essentially a
development of Justice Powell's opinion in that case. It would be dissonant for
her to adhere to the theory but reject its application there.
To determine whether diversity in higher education might survive as a
compelling interest under her "newest" equal protection jurisprudence requires
analysis of the nature of the interest in diversity in a university setting to see
whether it can be distinguished from settings where Justice O'Connor rejected
diversity and other nonremedial interests. Justice Powell's analysis of diversity
in Bakke emphasized three crucial aspects of that interest in higher education.
First, Justice Powell emphasized the special connection of diversity to academic
151 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
152 The Hopwood court, in denying the viability of Bakke, made much of Justice
O'Connor's statements that racial classifications should be "'reserved for remedial settings.'"
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 947 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
153 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
154 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986).
155 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990), overnded by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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freedom and the aims of higher education. The interest in a diverse student
body was permissible because it was connected with academic freedom which
"long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment." 156
Second, he emphasized that racial diversity is linked with vigorous debate.
Universities have "the right to select those students who will contribute the most
to the 'robust exchange of ideas,'.., a goal that is of paramount importance in
the fulfillment of [their] mission." 157 Third, Justice Powell emphasized that the
notion that racial diversity can only be part of a general concern with diversity
of all sorts. Diversity "encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which [race]... is but a single though important element. 158
The program struck down in Bakke was defective because it "focused solely on
ethnic diversity., 159 An acceptable racial preference program aimed at the goal
of diversity would have to be "flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements
of diversity ... and to place them on the same footing for consideration.' 60
The Harvard Plan that makes race a "plus" factor is his example. 161
The only subsequent Supreme Court decisionmaking use of the interest in
diversity was Metro Broadcasting, which extended Justice Powell's diversity
rationale to telecommunications. 162 In her dissent in that case, joined by Justices
156 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
157 Id. at 313.
158 Id. at 315.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 317.
161 See id. at 316. The Harvard Plan rejects set target quotas for race. Rather, race may
help "tip the balance in [an applicant's] favor just as geographic origin or a life spent on a
farm may tip the balance in other candidates' cases." Id.
162 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 572 (1990), overnded by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). The Court has since agreed to
consider affirmative action for diversity in employment. See Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91
F.3d 1547, 1553 (3rd Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997). In
Taxman, as in Wygant, a public school board laid off a white teacher before a Black one
solely to promote "cultural divers[ity]." Id. at 1552. The Third Circuit treated Taxman as a
Title VII rather than a constitutional case. The Board's policy flunked the Weber requirement
that a Title VII affirmative action policy must be purely remedial. See id. at 1563. Affirmative
action in layoffs also violated the Weber-Wygant requirement of not unnecessarily trammeling
nonminority interests. See id. at 1564. The Third Circuit rejected the applicability of the
Bakke diversity rationale in employment contexts, see id. at 1561-63, and refused to import
equal protection standards into a Title VII analysis, see id. at 1560. It cited somewhat
favorably to Hopwood on the status of Bakke, see id. at 1562 n.13, but noted that Justice
O'Connor "refer[s] favorably to Bakke," id. at 1563. On appeal, the plaintiff will almost
certainly win, and under the law as it stands, should win. How sweeping the Supreme Court's
holding will be is the question. Will it merely address the Title VII issues of statutory
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Kennedy and Scalia, Justice O'Connor strenuously objected that in the
telecommunications context the diversity rationale implied "generalizations
impermissibly equating race with thoughts and behavior." 163 She rejected the
idea that race is tied to a "'distinct perspective"' 164 or that there is a single
"'inority viewpoint." 1 65 Justice O'Connor explained, "[i]ndividuals of
unfavored racial and ethnic backgrounds are unlikely to possess the unique
experiences that contribute to viewpoint diversity."1 66 This seems to strike at
the heart of the idea that racial diversity can contribute "to the 'robust exchange
of ideas," ' 167 and in a context where the First Amendment, if not academic
freedom, is clearly relevant. But it need not be so construed.
First, no one arguing for diversity-promoting racial preference before
Justice O'Connor should start from the premise that there are distinctive
minority "viewpoints" or "perspectives." But the inclusion of race as an
element in diversity need not "rest on impermissible stereotyping," as the Metro
Broadcasting majority argued. 168 Surely Justice Powell, of all people, intended
no such thing in Bakke. Neither he nor the Metro Broadcasting Court expressed
the rationale very clearly, but it might be framed as follows.
There is no such thing as a minority viewpoint on anything, but
traditionally disfavored minorities have a broad common background of
experience with invidious discrimination that informs their views, whatever the
substantive content of those views. "Minority perspectives" on racial preference
range from Justice Marshall's to Justice Thomas's. However, it means
something quite different when Justice Marshall dismisses the stigma argument
than, for instance, when Justice Stevens does, or when Justice Thomas asserts
the stigma argument than when Justice Kennedy does. As Blacks, Justice
Marshall and Justice Thomas are in a position to address these and other issues
in ways that whites simply are not, whatever their conclusions. This is related
interpretation-as the Court of Appeals framed it, whether Title VII allows an employer with
a racially balanced work force to grant nonremedial racial preferences to promote racial
diversity, see id. at 1549-50,-or will it reach the constitutional interest in diversity? If so,
will the holding be restricted to employment contexts? These questions will be answered
around the time this Comment is published.
163 Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 615. It cannot be presumed that "persons think in a
manner associated with their race." Id. at 618.
164 Id. at 618 (quoting the Brief for the FCC at 17, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89453)).
165 Id. (quoting 68 F.C.C. 2d at 981 (1978 Policy Statement)).
166 Id. at 619.
167 Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 579 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978)).
168 Id.
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to their first-hand experience of invidious racial discrimination. 169 There is no
stereotyping here because this argument does not associate race with particular
attitudes. It simply says that race informs the whole range of attitudes. The
inclusion of persons with the experiences of minorities is therefore an
acceptable element in diversity.
Given the vehemence of her rejection of the idea of any connection of race
with attitudes, Justice O'Connor is unlikely to be moved by such
considerations. She might, however, accept an argument that the context of
higher education is different from telecommunications. The First Amendment
issues in higher education are tied to academic freedom and a university's right
to select its own student body, as Justice Powell commented. 170 There is no
corresponding right in telecommunications. First, nothing in
telecommunications corresponds to a university's selection of its own students,
and certainly not the FCC's selection of whom to grant broadcast licenses. The
FCC (unlike the media) has no First Amendment rights. This is because it is a
government agency-individuals have rights against the government, but the
government does not have rights against itself-or more narrowly, because its
activities involve the expenditure of federal funds under federally-sponsored
programs. 171
Second, it is not the position of the courts that telecommunications
inherently involves "robust debate" in the way that it has held that such debate
is inherent to the academic mission. 172 This is reflected in their upholding the
constitutionality of the FCC's elimination of the "fairness doctrine" in
broadcasting. That doctrine, requiring broadcasters to allow free equal time in
response to persons attacked in the broadcast media, was upheld as
constitutional under the First Amendment. 173 But the "essential basis" of the
fairness doctrine was not diversity but that the American public not be
uninformed. 174 Unlike the First Amendment issue involved in a university's
169 For some of Justice Marshall's experiences, see KLUGER, supra note 22, at 223-26,
passim. For Justice Thomas's experiences, see John Lancaster & Sharon LaFraniere,
Thomas: Growing Up Black in a White World, WASH. Posr, Sept. 8, 1991, at Al, and
Sharon LaFraniere, Despite Achievement, Thomas Felt Isolated: Rebuffs Stung Emerging
Conservative, WASH. PosT, Sept. 9, 1991, at Al.
170 See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
171 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178 (1991) (upholding legislative restrictions on
abortion advice in federally-funded family planning).172 See Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Bakke, 438 U.S. at
312 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (opinion of Frankfuirter,J.)).
173 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969).174 See Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
1090 [Vol. 58:1055
A NOT QUITE COLOR-BLIND CONSTIUON
right to select its own students to further robust debate, the right of reply under
the Fairness Doctrine was an administrative rather than a constitutional right.
This was made clear in CBS v. Democratic National Committee,175 where the
Court held that there is no constitutional right of access to broadcasting. Thus
there was no constitutional question when the FCC abolished that doctrine. 176
One might debate whether it would be a good thing were the Court to extend
the principle, and so the diversity rationale, to telecommunications, but its
refusal to do so does not threaten that rationale in higher education.
Third, the FCC policies Justice O'Connor attacked in Metro Broadcasting
did not respect Justice Powell's concern for individualized attention and taking
race into account only as one factor among many, a point on which Justice
O'Connor remarked in arguing that the FCC's minority set-aside and "fire
sale" policies were not narrowly tailored to the end of diversity. 177 She showed
her agreement with Justice Powell when she observed that "the FCC has failed
to implement a case-by-case determination and that failure is particularly
unjustified when individualized hearings already occur." 178 The law school
affirmative action program challenged in Hopwood v. Texas failed to respect
these concerns in having a separate admissions process for minorities that did
not allow them to be compared with all other applicants. It accordingly failed
under Bakke, but a "Harvard Plan" program that took race into account as a
"plus factor" would respect them and would survive under Bakke. 179
Unlike the situation with remedial racial preference in employment and
government contracting, then, the status of nonremedial affirmative action in
higher education is at least in some doubt under Justice O'Connor's equal
protection jurisprudence. It is reasonable to surmise that her hint in Wygant that
"the Court may find other [nonremedial] governmental interests [than diversity]
which have been relied on by the lower courts but which have not been passed
on here to be sufficiently... 'compelling" ' 180 is stillborn. She is unlikely to
allow any such interests. Whether she will continue to maintain that diversity is
a compelling enough interest for affirmative action in university admissions to
survive depends on whether she can be persuaded that the university context is
distinct from telecommunications, where she rejected that rationale, and from
other situations where she concluded that only remedial interests are
175 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
176 See Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430 (8th Cir. 1993).
177 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 621 (1990) (citing Bakke, 438
U.S. at 314), overndedby Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).178 Id. at 621-22.
179 See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 578-79 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
180 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986).
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compelling. In Wygant, she suggested that she accepts such a distinction.' 8 '
Given the importance of Bakke in her thinking on this topic and of Justice
Powell's equal protection jurisprudence as a precursor of her own, it is not
unlikely that she will do so when confronted with a case. The outcome is a
close call, but a firm basis exists for the distinction.
D. Shaw v. Reno and Heightened Strict Scrutiny in Voting Contexts
It might seem that Justice O'Connor's views on race-consciousness in voter
districting add little to the equal protection doctrine discussed thus far. In Shaw
v. Reno (Shaw 1), Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held that a North
Carolina voter districting plan, designed to concentrate Black voters in a
"bizarre" 182 and irregularly shaped district which tracked the path of an
interstate highway across the state classified citizens for no other reason but
their race. 183 As noted, however, she expressly rejected any claim of a
"constitutional right to participate in a 'color-blind' electoral process." She
says, "[R]ace-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional." 184 Why
then does the voting context present any special question about the nature of her
equal protection jurisprudence, as opposed to concerns about whether she has
correctly applied her own standard to the cases before the Court?
The issue arises because in this case Justice O'Connor acknowledged the
bare fact of racial classification as a form of cognizable injury on which voters
181 See id. ("[Dliversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in... higher
education.... ."); see also Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1553 (3rd Cir. 1996)
(en banc), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997) (posing the question of nonremedial interests
in diversity in the context of employment). Given the lack of First Amendment concerns in
employment contexts, Justice O'Connor is unlikely to find diversity in educational
employment to be a compelling constitutional interest or in accord with Title VII, given the
admitted lack of legislative history or case law supporting such interests. See id. at 1558.
182 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993). It should be said at once that the interpretation that Justice
O'Connor invoked some sort of a constitutional right to a "non-bizarre," aesthetically
satisfying district shape is clearly mistaken. The "bizarre" shape matters only insofar as it
creates an inference of race-conscious classification. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941,
1961-62 (1996) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (citing Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct.
2475, 2486 (1995).(opinion of Kennedy, J.)).
183 See Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 644. Strictly speaking, the holding in the case is not that the
plan is invalid but that the appellants stated a cognizable claim. The case was remanded to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with Justice O'Connor's majority opinion. See
id. at 658. The North Carolina plan was invalidated in Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1899
(1996) (Shaw II) (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
184 Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 641-42.
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of any race may sue. In particular, she distinguishes Shaw I from the Court's
main precedent on race-conscious remedial districting, United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey (UJO).'8 5 In UJO, the Court treated the Brooklyn
Hassidic community's challenge to a race-conscious plan designed to maximize
Black voting strength as a vote dilution claim. It rejected the claim that the plan
diluted any group's vote, with three Justices remarking that the plan
"represented no... stigma with respect to whites or any other race"186 and
two holding that it involved no "invidious purpose of discriminating against
white voters." 187 These are the traditional grounds for invalidating racial
classifications.
Justice O'Connor, however, did not treat the plan challenged in Shaw I as
even potentially involving vote dilution, intentional stigmatization, or invidious
discrimination. Rather, she framed it as involving "separat[ion of]
voters.., on the basis of race" 188 and for that reason presumptively improper,
since no other harm than having been classified according to race was alleged.
This might seem to skate close to the color-blind view that Justice O'Connor
expressly rejected in her opinion and which I have argued she does not hold, on
which racial classification is per se wrong merely because it classifies by
race. 189
It is unlikely that Shaw I represents a temporary switch to a color-blind
view from Croson and then back again in Adarand Constructors. Shaw I, in
fact, offers Justice O'Connor's most unambiguous rejection of that doctrine.
Rather, a careful examination of her opinion suggests rather that for her the
voting context was different from that of employment, government contracting,
or (perhaps) education. Her reasoning was that in this area, as opposed to
those, race neutrality has a special symbolic or "expressive"' 190 significance.
She said, "[W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances
do matter." 191 Her usual concerns about racial stereotyping, the worry that
racial classifications will further the idea that members of the same race "think
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at
185 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
186 Id. at 165.
187 Id. at 180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
188 Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 649.
189 See Robert A. Curtis, Note, Race-Based Equal Protection Claims After Shaw v.
Reno, 44 DuKE L.J. 298, 308 (1994). "The unique contribution of Shaw is that it makes racial
classification in itself a personal, individualized injury." Id.190 Id. at 304.
191 Shaw1, 509 U.S. at 647.
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the polls,"' 92 take on a special salience in a political context. She worried that
racial "gerrymander[ing]" 193 "bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political
apartheid." 194 Finally, she thought that race-based apportionments might tempt
elected officials "to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the
members of [their own] group, rather than their constituency as a whole. "195
Accordingly, the strict scrutiny for all racial classifications was effectively
heightened for voting contexts. Justice Souter seemed to think that Justice
O'Connor rejected the idea of having "two distinct approaches to equal
protection analysis, one for cases of electoral districting and one for most other
types of ... governmental decisions." 196 He would invoke a lower degree of
scrutiny, whether intermediate or a lowered strict scrutiny, in voting cases. 197
But Justice O'Connor did have two distinct approaches. She said that a "racial
gerrymander... should [not] receive less scrutiny... than [any] other state
legislation classifying citizens by race." 198 This, however, does not mean that
they get the same scrutiny. Having lowered strict scrutiny to non-fatal intensity
in the employment and contracting contexts, she raised it to a higher but still
theoretically non-fatal level in apportionment cases.
Justice O'Connor emphasized that the mere taking of race into account, or
its playing a motivating role in a districting decision is not by itself enough to
trigger this heightened strict scrutiny, much less to fail it. 199 The more intensive
review is called for when "the State has relied on race in substantial disregard
of customary and traditional districting practices." 200 It would not be in order
"if race-neutral.., considerations predominated over racial ones." 201 In a lone
concurrence to her plurality opinion in Bush v. Vera, she said that as long as
race is not used "for its own sake or as a proxy [for political characteristics,
which would involve stereotyping], States may intentionally create majority-
minority districts and may otherwise take race into consideration, without
192Id.
193 Id. at 648. Professor Guinier objected to the term "gerrymandering" because the
North Carolina plan did not "arbitrarily allocate disproportionate political power to any
group." Guim, supra note 20, at 264 n.11 (citing Shaw L, 509 U.S. at 656-57).
194 Shaw1, 509 U.S. at 647.
195 Id. at 648.
196 Id. at 684-85 (Souter, J., dissenting).
197 See id.
198 Id. at 646 (emphasis added).
199 See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1951 (1996) ("Strict scrutiny does not apply
merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race."). In this regard,
Justice O'Connor said that she differs with Justice Thomas. See id. at 1952.200 Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2497 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201 Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1954.
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coming under strict scrutiny. "202 It underlined her rejection of color-blindness
that race may be a factor without even triggering strict scrutiny. But if racial
considerations predominate, strict scrutiny applies, and in the particularly
intensive form Justice O'Connor deems appropriate for voting contexts.
Justice O'Connor's reasons for this heightened strict scrutiny are not
particularly satisfactory. First, stereotyping is not applicable here. If "shar[ing]
the same political interests" 203 is a legitimate basis for voter districting, persons
who share such interests need not for that reason be presumed to think alike or
even to prefer the same candidates. They may differ on what policies or
candidates will further their shared interests. But to deny that racial minority
status, particularly in North Carolina, 204 may be one factor in constituting a
shared political interest, fails to exhibit Justice O'Connor's usual sensitivity to
racial realities.
Second, as Professor Guinier noted, Justice O'Connor's strictures about
political apartheid are inapposite because the challenged district was the most
racially integrated in the state. 205 Additionally, South African Apartheid was
invidious, designed to deprive disenfranchised minorities of political power,
while race-conscious districting plans, by contrast, have the opposite purpose
and so are noninvidious. The "resembl[ance]" between the North Carolina
plan, designed to enhance minority voting power without diluting white votes,
and "the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past," 206 designed to ensure
that only white votes counted at all, is hard to discern.
Third, the concern about the behavior of elected officials is related to her
worry about "racial politics" in Croson,207 and suffers from similar defects. 208
Justice O'Connor surely did not entertain the unworthy suspicion that elected
minority officials would disregard the interests of white constituents. That the
concern is baseless should be evident even from the merely prudential need of
elected minority officials to maintain interracial electoral support to win
contested elections. At any rate, strict scrutiny should involve inquiry into
202 Id. at 1969. This statement did not gain the support of the plurality.
2 03 Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647.
204 Justice O'Connor herself remarked on the "Attorney General's imposition of the
[Voting Rights Act] § 5 preclearance requirement [for voter district changes] on 40 North
Carolina counties [imposed where minorities have been subject to discrimination in the
exercise of the franchise], and [on] the Gingles District Court's findings of a long history of
official racial discrimination ... and of pervasive racial bloc voting." Id. at 656. Similar
observations apply to Georgia (Miller) and Texas (Vera).
205 See GunER, supra note 20, at 265 n.11.
206 Shaw1, 509 U.S. at 641.
207 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510-11 (1989).
208 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
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whether this worry is justified. Merely raising the possibility is not applying
"the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by
race.",
209
Justice O'Connor's best reason was that there is a symbolic value to a
strong presumption of race neutrality in voting apportionment. This is
undoubtedly true. Still, it is hard to see why this gives rise to a heightened strict
scrutiny as opposed to the same strict scrutiny that applies in all other cases of
racial classification or why in the voting context the bare fact of racial
classification should be a cognizable harm without evidence of animus,
stigmatization, or vote dilution.
Does Justice O'Connor hold that the symbolic importance of race neutrality
in politics is so important that in voting apportionment a rule of color-blindness
must be adopted here, even if it is rejected in other contexts? Her acceptance of
racial classification itself as a presumptive harm might suggest this. And she
said, "Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us
into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a
political system in which race no longer matters. '210 It might be inferred that in
voting apportionment, unlike in employment or government contracting, not
even clearly remedial purposes will constitute a compelling interest that would
justify a racial classification. This would be a misreading of her views.
First, Justice O'Connor took care to distinguish the facts and appellants'
claim in Shaw I from those in UJO, noting that the latter was a vote dilution
case and the former, as she reads it, was not. She did not attack the holding of
UJO, which remains good law.211 If a race-based reapportionment is meant to
correct a Voting Rights Act violation, it should withstand even the heightened
strict scrutiny that Justice O'Connor applied in voting cases. In reply to Justice
Souter's objection in Shaw I that taking race into account is appropriate in
voting reapportionment because "racial bloc voting... dilut[es] minority
voting strength, '212 Justice O'Connor said that "racial bloc voting and
209 Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 644.
210 Id. at 657 (emphasis added).
211 It is unclear, though, whether she regards the plan approved in UJO as race-
conscious at all. She said that it "could [not] be understood only as an effort to segregate
voters by race," id. at 651, and noted that in that case three Justices approved it "in part,
precisely because it adhered to traditional districting principles," id. (citing United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168 (1977) (opinion of White, J., joined by Stevens &
Rehnquist, JJ.)). Of course a race-conscious remedial districting plan is not "only... an
effort to segregate voters by race," but one that tries, among other things, to remedy historical
disproportions of political power, so these statements are consistent with regarding the plan in
UJO as race-conscious.2 12 Id. at 680 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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minority-group political cohesion can never be assumed, but specifically must
be proved in each case" in order to establish illegal vote dilution.213 Without
such specific proof, "'there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy." 214
With such proof, race-conscious remedies may be appropriate. Vote dilution
may provide grounds for creation of a majority-minority district if certain
conditions, including minority political cohesion and white bloc voting are
proven.215 Nor is vote dilution the only permissible basis for taking race into
account. A race-conscious districting plan may not go "beyond what [is]
reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression" of the position of minorities with
respect to effective exercise of the franchise,216 but it may go as far as
reasonably necessary.
Justice O'Connor's demand for specific proof in each case is merely an
instance of her general insistence on particularized findings as a condition of
any race-conscious remedies. The requirements of proof impose an additional,
but not insuperable, burden on the legislature in its reapportionment planning.
The requirements prevent racial redistricting based on the mere assumption that
minorities in a geographical area are politically cohesive and that white voters
engage in racial bloc voting. However, the required proof does not prohibit
taking race into account in redistricting as a remedy when these predicates are
shown to be satisfied. The question remains open, however, what Justice
O'Connor would consider as an adequate showing that the predicates are
satisfied.
In particular, it is unsettled whether Justice O'Connor regarded it as a
further necessary predicate of permissible race-conscious voter districting that
taking race into account is only permissible to remedy a prima facie violation of
the Voting Rights Act or the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, as opposed
to merely remedying an unfortunate but not illegal disvaluing of minority voting
strength. On the former view, the heightened strict scrutiny she applied to voter
apportionment would approach the demand of the color-blind theory that the
only legitimate basis for taking race into account is to remedy a constitutional or
statutory violation, a very stringent standard indeed. This is not required by the
213 Id. at 653.
214 Id. at 655 (quoting Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 (1993)).
215 See id. at 655 (citing Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and Voinovich v.
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993)). Subsequently, Justice O'Connor explicitly said that race-
conscious districting might be justified to cure a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1960-61 (1996).
216 Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 655 (1993) (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141
(1976) (approving the creation of a majority-minority district designed to improve the voting
position of racial minorities)).
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tough but lower standard of a showing of political cohesion and racial bloc
voting. On the latter view, remedial race-conscious districting is permissible
even without a finding of a prima facie violation of the law, as with racial
preference in employment. 217
Justice O'Connor did not hold in any express way that a finding of illegal
vote dilution or retrogression is necessary. But she did treat the mere fact of
racial classification as a cognizable injury if done without "sufficient
justification." 218 The examples of sufficient justification she considers are all
Voting Rights Act or constitutional violations. 219 It is simply unclear whether
she would regard anything less as sufficient. Indeed, it appears that she has not
made up her mind. She said that "only three Justices in UJO were prepared to
say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of
racial bloc voting apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act." 220
She declined to say here whether she agrees with them or not.
The upshot is that Shaw I is a refinement in Justice O'Connor's equal
protection jurisprudence of race, not a departure from it. In even more
unambiguous terms than in Croson and Adarand Constructors, she rejected
color-blindness as an interpretation of equal protection. She indicated that
voting is a special context where symbolic appearances require an especially
strong justification to overcome a presumption of governmental race-neutrality,
more even than to overcome the strict scrutiny to which other sorts of
governmental action are subject. But it may be overcome, at the minimum by a
particularized showing of minority group political cohesion and white racial
bloc voting; at the maximum, by a showing of a Voting Rights Act or
constitutional voting rights violation. Remedial racial classifications even in
voting will pass Justice O'Connor's heightened strict scrutiny if properly
justified.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF RACIAL PREFERENCE PROGRAMS
Justice O'Connor's signal contribution to equal protection jurisprudence of
2 17 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286, 290-91 (1986) (O'Connor,
J. concurring).
218 Shaw L, 509 U.S. at 649, 652.
219 See id. at 653-57; Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1960-63. Speaking only for herself, Justice
O'Connor said that "the state interest in avoiding liability under Voting Rights Act § 2 [for
vote dilution] is compelling" and that creation of a district that "'substantially addresses'" that
liability will satisfy narrow tailoring. Id. at 1970.
220 Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 657 (citing United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144, 167-68 (1977) (opinion of White, J., joined by Stevens & Rehnquist, JJ.)).
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race has been the establishment of a minimum strict scrutiny standard
(somewhat heightened in the case of voting apportionment) for all racial
classifications, remedial or otherwise, invidious or not. This is not tantamount
to a color-blind interpretation of the Constitution. Indeed, it contradicts a color-
blind interpretation. Justice O'Connor's doctrine may be best understood as
"not quite color-blind," acknowledging the aspiration towards a society in
which "race no longer matters,"221 but also recognizing that we are not there
yet. She sees that the equal dignity and respect that all persons are guaranteed
under the Equal Protection Clause may allow at least remedial use of racial
classifications to correct for historical and ongoing governmental racial
discrimination.
She has not addressed their nonremedial uses in educational contexts, but
while her view of the diversity rationale outside such contexts is dim, she may
hew to Justice Powell's finding that in such contexts the interest in diversity is
compelling. Her view is within the spirit of the modem tradition, as the color-
blind theory is not, both in her analysis of the immorality of racism and in her
conception of the sorts of remedies that government may invoke to address it.
One might argue that a two-standard view of the Justice Brennan sort is more in
keeping with that tradition, but such a debate would be rather scholastic. The
single standard is law and will remain so for the foreseeable future, largely due
to Justice O'Connor's efforts.
Justice O'Connor does not always apply her own standard with the degree
of generosity and concern for the plight of racial minorities her language
sometimes suggests. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. was rightly decided under
the new standard, given the lack of particularized findings of racial
discrimination in the Richmond construction industry. But Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena should arguably have been decided in the same way
as Justice Powell's concurrence in Fulilove v. Klutznick, approving the
challenged plan under strict scrutiny. Concern about precedent and
Congressional powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment should
have further tilted the balance towards this result. In Shaw v. Reno (Shaw 1),
after insisting that a race-conscious apportionment plan must be justified by
evidence of minority cohesion and racial bloc voting, and then providing that
evidence, she proceeded to ignore it. 222 Justice O'Connor's own standard might
have been perhaps more consistently and correctly applied to give different
results in these cases. Practically speaking, litigators on both sides must be
aware of Justice O'Connor's tendency to apply her own test more stringently
than it demands, and legislators designing such programs would do well to pay
221 Shawl, 509 U.S. at 657.
222 See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
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close attention to the requirements she imposes on the justification of such
programs, especially in regard to detailed findings of discrimination in the
appropriate jurisdiction.
Racial preference programs, then, have a constitutional place.223 In
2 23 The California "Civil Rights Initiative" proposed an amendment to the state
constitution, approved in November 1996, reading in relevant part, "The state shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting." CAL. CoNsr. Art. 1, § 31(a) (West 1997). The Ninth
Circuit upheld the amendment. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431,
1440, 1448 (9th. Cir. 1997). The case is likely to reach the Supreme Court. How might
Justice O'Connor decide this case?
Justice O'Connor is very much in favor of federalism and states rights. See, e.g., New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (finding a violation of
the Tenth Amendment). But she says, "TIhe Fourteenth Amendment is an explicit constraint
on state power." Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989). While Justice
O'Connor holds that racial preferences may be constitutional, she remarked, "[in the context
of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the difference between what
the law permits and what it requires." Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 654. Would she say that a state
may prohibit any governmental unit in its jurisdiction from doing something it is
constitutionally permitted but not constitutionally required to do?
Perhaps the best hint is to be found in her joining the majority opinion in Romer v.
Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (opinion of Kennedy, J.). There the Court, using a heightened
rational basis test, struck down an amendment to the Colorado state constitution, also passed
by referendum, that forbade any governmental unit in the state from extending protection
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The amendment "impos[es] a broad
and undifferentiated disability on a single named group" in a way "inexplicable by anything
[except] animus." Id. at 1627. The disability is to forbid homosexuals the safeguards "that
others enjoy or may seek without constraint. They can obtain specific protection against
discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the state constitution." Id;
cf Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidating a state constitutional amendment
that prohibited any governmental unit in the state from interfering with a private individual's
right to discriminate in the sale or lease of housing).
The California Civil Rights Amendment may be motivated not by a desire to
discriminate, unlike that in Reitman, or by animus against a named group, unlike that in
Romer, but by a sincere adherence to the color-blind theory of equal protection. So the
question may be framed: is simply burdening minority groups by preventing them from
seeking this sort of protection in state and local law, without that burden being motivated by
racial animus, sufficient for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment? The answer probably
depends on how much weight Justice O'Connor placed, in joining the Romer majority, on the
issue of animus rather than on that of special burden. And this we do not know. But nothing
in her theory of equal protection as regards racial preference requires her to vote to uphold the
amendment or prohibits her from voting to strike it down.
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employment and government contracting, there can be no doubt that a properly
justified and narrowly tailored remedial program should withstand an equal
protection challenge. In higher education, there is more doubt about Bakke, but
at present that case remains law at least outside the Fifth Circuit. In voting
apportionment, a race-conscious plan designed to address a prima facie
constitutional or Voting Rights Act violation should survive, and one designed
to overcome white racial bloc voting might well do so if the facts about
discrimination are fully documented.
Reports of the death of racial preference programs are therefore much
exaggerated. Neither the current nor any future Court applying Justice
O'Connor's strict scrutiny test will be able to find that racial preference
programs are per se unconstitutional without overruling the line of opinions I
have discussed. A future Court might use her test to approve such programs in a
spirit more like that of the Burger and early Rehnquist Courts, although in a
more constrained way. The result of Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence has been
to secure their constitutional status in a strong but limited way, and not to
undermine it.
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